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Abstract: This essay considers the dual register of the term “affec-
tive economy” and in the process hones in on the use of photog-
raphy and videography in NoViolet Bulawayo’s 2013 novel We 
Need New Names. It builds on Susan Sontag’s consideration of 
the emotional trade in photographs to examine how the neolib-
eral privatization of aid and charity has created a brisk trade in 
and expectations about African subjects’ performance of suffering. 
This performance fosters an affect of superiority in consuming, 
Northern subjects that reinforces the capricious nature of private 
interest and investment in the Global South. Bulawayo’s novel 
adroitly distinguishes between performances of suffering that are 
meant as tokens of exchange with outsiders and the necessity of 
suffering as a point of emotional cathexis within the community. 
It offers a critical depiction of collective mourning in response to 
the failure of democratic elections and underscores politics’ utter 
dependency on economics under neoliberalism.
Keywords: affect, economy, photography, globalization, NoViolet 
Bulawayo

Helon Habila’s review of NoViolet Bulawayo’s 2013 novel We Need 
New Names accuses Bulawayo of engaging in the depiction and pro-
liferation of “poverty porn.”1 As he remarks, her novel draws from 
the well of “suffering African” images: “[C]hild soldiers, genocide, 
child prostitution, female genital mutilation, political violence, police 
brutality, dictatorships, predatory preachers, dead bodies on the road-
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side.” His objection to this litany of images is the “sort of creeping 
horror that leads to a desensitisation to the reality being represented.” 
Habila’s critique of Bulawayo’s novel is hardly fair, as evidenced by 
the grammar of his sentence that references “the reality being rep-
resented” (emphasis added). Habila cannot quibble with Bulawayo’s 
truthful representation of suffering (nor should he, considering that 
his own books traffic in these of-the-moment reflections of contem-
porary African life). 
Habila is not alone, however; a growing chorus of African writers 
are agitating for alternatives, asking for, as it were, other realities to be 
depicted. Transnational Congolese novelist Alain Mabanckou concurs, 
remarking in his Letter to Jimmy:
A variety of African literature known as “child soldier” litera-
ture—or as “Rwandan genocide” literature, when it was cre-
ated more in protest than in an effort to truly understand the 
tragedies—convinced me definitively that we were not yet free 
of the vortex of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and that the sentimentality 
and moralizing current that runs through some of these works 
does harm to African literature. If we are not careful, an African 
author will be able to do nothing but await the next disaster 
on his continent before starting a book in which he will spend 
more time denouncing than writing. (68)
Both Habila and Mabanckou couch their concerns in the assumption 
that African novels are consumed primarily by white, Euro-American 
readers. In a 2014 New York Times editorial, Nigerian novelist Adaobi 
Tricia Nwaubani remarks that although “in the past decade, marvelous 
things have happened for African literature[,] . . . success for an African 
writer still depends on the West.” As support, she cites macroscopic pub-
lishing trends that indicate most African literature is generated in and 
therefore for the West, with limited or no access to publication or distri-
bution available on the continent. Such is the bind of the contemporary 
African novelist; in spite of economic and political gains, African writ-
ers are still beholden to Western desires for African literature. Habila, 
Mabanckou, and Nwaubani agree on Westerners’ appetites: “Why else 
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have brutality and depravity been the core of many celebrated African 
stories?” Nwaubani asks rhetorically. 
 It thus seems a truth nearly universally recognized that African litera-
ture is still written, on some level, with the Western reader in mind. Yet 
this is where Habila’s critique of Bulawayo’s work misses the mark. Yes, 
her novel trades in images of gut-wrenching suffering and there are mo-
ments of breathtaking violence and pain throughout. Bulawayo, how-
ever, is not guilty of sentimentalizing or monumentalizing this violence, 
as Mabanckou suggests. It becomes clear over the course of the novel 
that Bulawayo’s critique of the developed world’s appetite for images 
of suffering is a funhouse mirror that shatters stereotypes held by sub-
Saharan Africans of ungoverned, unproblematic wealth often associated 
with American life. 
 As much as wealthy Northerners might want to deny their presump-
tion of superiority, the Western world perpetually and unconsciously 
performs this superiority in its affective consumption of the postcolony. 
Northern consumption of postcolonial literature tends to favor novels 
that confirm presumptions of Southern suffering or depict characters 
whose class status renders them “relatable” to Northern readers. We Need 
New Names, which explicitly reframes the rhetorical terms of postco-
lonial theory, emerged among a cluster of interrelated and celebrated 
transnational novels. 2013 saw the publication of Bulawayo’s novel, 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Americanah, Taiye Selasi’s Ghana Must 
Go, and Jhumpa Lahiri’s The Lowlands. Yet the rider “transnational” also 
highlights the univocality of the class status of these texts’ characters—
they are subjects with the capital necessary for expatriation and/or re-
patriation and their concerns are more in keeping with the bourgeois 
concerns of wealthy Northerners than the plight of the much larger 
proletarian citizenry of the postcolony. Unlike Adichie, Selasi, and other 
contemporary transnational women writers, however, Bulawayo is con-
sciously engaged in creating a new discourse from the problematic but 
generous(ly hybridized) space of the displaced, transnational citizen 
who is tethered to a postcolonial and a metropolitan “home” and denied 
citizenship in both. As Bulawayo explains in an interview with Claire 
Vaye Watkins, she is “trying to say that we need new identities, new 
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ways of seeing things, new ways of being,” especially in the wake of the 
“lost decade” in Zimbabwe’s recent history, which as a result of Robert 
Mugabe’s authoritarian politics was filled with strife, cronyism, fraud, 
and corruption (Bulawayo, “Interview”). 
 Bulawayo’s novel relentlessly critiques presumptuous Northern supe-
riority to postcolonial subjects and dissects how postcolonial suffering is 
commodified and traded by Northerners in a materialist affective econ-
omy that is grounded in the production and dissemination of telegenic 
images of suffering. By skewering the supposition of generosity and con-
science that undergirds the trade in postcolonial pain through causes 
célèbres, Bulawayo reveals a set of social habits enacted by consuming 
(Northern) subjects that efface the complex subjectivity of the produc-
ing (Southern) subject. This habitus of individual aid is a symptom of 
neoliberal late capitalism, which displaces the impulse to provide aid, 
assistance, and charity to private subjects, reifies Northern subjects’ as-
sumption of privilege, and reiterates the necessity of the performance of 
Southern suffering.
 Analyses of the economy of affect diverge according to two under-
standings of the terminology. On one hand, the “affective economy” 
describes the late capitalism of highly modernized nations: the increas-
ing manufacture not of material goods but of intangible technês (such as 
computer programs, applications, and algorithms and inter-referenced 
databases, marketing campaigns, and social media management) used 
to make and distribute consumer goods as well as cultivate, distribute, 
market, and commodify services and experiences. This transition from 
tangible, material commodities to intangible, experiential, processual, 
and service goods is rooted in the waning of Fordism and the rise of 
Toyotaism (which stresses management, experience, and virtuality). 
Understanding it permits us to see that the economic subjugation of the 
Global South is accelerating. Michael Hardt writes: 
The fact that informatization and the shift toward services is 
most recognizable in the dominant capitalist countries should 
not lead us back to an understanding of the contemporary 
global economic situation in terms of stages of development—
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as if today the dominant countries were informational service 
economies, their first subordinates industrial economies, and 
those further subordinated agricultural. (92) 
Hardt lobs a corrective to first/second/third world terminology (irrel-
evant in the neoliberal era following the “end of history”) as well as the 
teleological insistence on the necessity of “developing” as opposed to 
(having already) “developed.” The rhetoric inherent in the present per-
fect links the fate of so-described countries to an asymptotic relationship 
with the completed work of development and maintains an irreducible 
gap between the teleological endpoint and the work of these nations’ 
implied economic aspirations. It is important to note how earlier ideolo-
gies of the international division of labor, from colonialism and impe-
rialism through the era of modernization, have continued to “exclude” 
sub-Saharan countries “from capital flows and new technologies, from 
even the illusion of development strategies,” thus pushing these societies 
en masse to the “verge of starvation” in an incoherently organized late 
capitalism that continues to privilege the privileged (Hardt 92).
 On the other hand, a burgeoning trade in “affect” as a commodity2 is 
a result of the mystification of production and the rarification of “ser-
vice” and intangible goods (smartphone apps, social media platforms) 
in the affective economy. In this economy, our affective/emotional/psy-
chological profiles determine our ability and desire to consume.3 Affect 
is generated and expended in material and immaterial production, but 
it primarily fuels the latter (just as, in classic economic examples, bread 
metabolizes in the manual worker’s body). Affect “appreciates” or accrues 
“interest” when the affect generated in the exchange of object and sign 
gains value through the labor of evaluation, criticism, and appreciation. 
Hardt ties this accumulation of surplus affect to the “processes of eco-
nomic postmodernization” (or “informatization”) (90). These two ver-
sions of the affective economy—the economy that depends on the affect 
of the producer and the economy that depends on the affect of the con-
sumer—thus necessarily collude in the determination of value in affect. 
 Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that the surplus value attendant to 
affect is situated in a “non-place . . . that is no longer either outside or 
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inside capital” (82). Affect has its own economy of value that does not 
yet appear to be totally coincident with the extant financial economy 
of value but certainly impinges on it. The value of affect in the affec-
tive economy is such that “labor-power is presented as the social fabric, 
as population and culture, traditions and innovation, and so forth—in 
short, its productive force is exploited within the processes of social re-
production,” and affective labor is the labor that is masked by our focus 
on traditional forms of labor (Hardt and Negri 83; emphasis added). 
Increasing “investments” in affect, however, have begun demonstrating 
the links between the circulation of capital (as traditionally understood) 
and the circulation of affect-as-capital (in this newer sense). Affect (un-
derstood more capaciously not just as the Spinozist “power to act” but 
also as emotion or feeling) is already imbricated in the uneven produc-
tive practices of capitalism. Sub-Saharan Africa, sidelined from both the 
projects of modernization and informatization, is subjected to a circuitry 
of affective production and exchange over which it has no control.
 Bulawayo picks up on the paradox contained herein: deprived of the 
ability to provide for themselves through formerly structural means such 
as a national infrastructure of manufacturing or a consolidated and effi-
cacious agricultural industry, Zimbabweans are structurally subjugated. 
Increasingly, the only means by which they can provide for themselves 
is to trade on their bodies’ apparently limitless capacity for generating 
affect, not just for themselves but for expropriation. It is no surprise that 
the parents of Darling, the protagonist in We Need New Names, are both 
essentially ejected from Zimbabwe in order to satisfy their basic mate-
rial needs. Her mother trades goods on the southern border with South 
Africa and her father left “with everybody [else]” across that border. He 
asks: “Is this [Zimbabwe in the early aughts] what I went to univer-
sity for?” (Bulawayo, We Need 91–92). As Darling notes, everyone with 
any education or skill has fled: “I don’t go to school anymore because 
all the teachers left to teach over in South Africa and Botswana and 
Namibia and them, where there’s better money” (30–31). The global 
flows of capital in contemporary capitalism are such that the movement 
of bodies over borders to satisfy material needs is inevitable. The novel 
makes clear, although never explicit, that the Zimbabwe it depicts is 
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bereft of industrial labor and employment for unskilled workers. The 
only appearance of remunerated labor is at a jobsite funded and over-
seen by Chinese contractors. Even there, it is not clear that the jobsite 
pays adequately—the children go to see an acquaintance, Moshe, only 
to be told that he left for South Africa, where the pay is better, days 
before (44). Ironically highlighting the income inequality rampant in 
Zimbabwe’s economy, a Chinese man brags to the children: “We build 
you big mall. All nice shops inside, Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Versace, and 
so on so on” (46). The construction of a luxury shopping center in a 
country that lacks adequate employment infrastructure is paradigmatic 
of late capitalism’s hyperbolic income inequality. The children laugh, 
their only coping mechanism for the perversity of their poverty in the 
midst of self-indulgence. 
 Bulawayo is fairly uninterested in describing the material economy of 
her characters—at least until Darling arrives in “Destroyedmichigan” 
(Darling’s apt portmanteau for “Detroit, Michigan”)—but her recurrent 
description of their poverty is a reminder of their economic disenfran-
chisement. These descriptions work at a low buzz in the text. Despite 
Darling’s critical eye, readers do not see into poverty; instead, they are 
asked to look outward from within the experience of it.
 It is this critical eye that permits Bulawayo to focus less on the faux-
naïve strategy of seducing her bourgeois readers with the exoticism of 
the Southern Other’s poverty, as Habila suggests, than in registering cri-
tiques of uncritical Northern privilege in terms that the reader cannot 
escape being interpellated by. In Northern hands, Bulawayo’s text be-
comes a mirror-cipher for the bourgeois Northern subject: as Jacques 
Lacan argues, the “mirror stage” of psychological development is not a 
discrete moment in children’s coming-into-consciousness but rather an 
internalized structure that continues to frame the subject’s self-awareness 
through the rubrics of refracted or reflected desire. The text’s cultivation 
of this mirroring is a perversion of one of the mechanisms it works to 
undermine—the viral cause.
 In the contemporary era of social media, informatization, and the 
privatization of the aid/development industry under neoliberalism, the 
worlds of research, charity, and humanitarianism fight for people’s at-
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tention and resources alongside consumer goods. All clamor for capital 
and innovations in viral marketing mean that social causes employ social 
media tools to generate financial support. A chief instance of this in 
contemporary Africa was the runaway success of the Kony 2012 video, 
which was cannily edited and collated to reveal the tremendous ideo-
logical and physical abuse of children and their conscription in Joseph 
Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army. As Joseph Kahne and Ellen Middagh 
note, more than sixty percent of young people polled said that they 
were familiar with this particular cause because of social media (52). 
The commodification of humanitarian causes has unfortunately created 
a thriving economy of “slacktivism,” which is broadly understood as 
virtual indulgence in affects of outrage and anger that are typically en-
acted by the propagation of information about a cause on social media 
platforms rather than participation in the political cause itself. The 2014 
social media campaign against Nigerian terrorist organization Boko 
Haram under the umbrella of #bringbackourgirls is a recent example of 
this approach. Celebrities and citizens worldwide posted photos online 
in which they held signs bearing the hashtag in an inchoate effort to 
spur the Nigerian government to action in rescuing schoolgirls, who 
were mass-abducted by Boko Haram. The problem with slacktivism is 
that it does not often achieve its ambitious goals. It competes for atten-
tion with the twenty-four-hour news cycle, targeted advertising, and the 
irruption of other causes. Slacktivism ostensibly ennobles the practicing 
subject at the cost of material social or political reform.
 Patricia Daley points out that “[h]umanitarian aid comes increas-
ingly from Western governments[,] . . . [is] supplemented by donations 
from citizens [and] has become corporatised and professionalised at the 
same time that neoliberal economic restructuring has reduced state-
provisioned social welfare” (375–76). Daley draws on the work of Mark 
Duffield, who contends that the contemporary humanitarian system 
functions “as an international insurance of last resort for the world’s 
non-insured and erstwhile self-reliant peoples” who receive aid when 
“self-reliance breaks down and former colonial states, never having de-
veloped a welfare system, prove unwilling and unable to cope” (qtd. in 
Daley 66–67). Neoliberalism means that, although the largest percent-
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age of humanitarian aid still comes from governmental agencies, this 
aid is shrinking in the national budgets of donor nations even as it is in-
creasingly necessary to address humanitarian issues in countries that do 
not have the resources to fight such problems (as the recent West African 
outbreak of Ebola has proven). The foreshortened “cycle” of these causes 
is abetted by the increasing participation of celebrities in the commodi-
fication of humanitarian causes, the result of which is 
that celebrities, as branded commodities—in essence neolib-
eral subjectivities—and their advocacy, serve to enhance con-
sumer capitalism—thus helping firstly to commodify humani-
tarianism as a largely privatised concern that sits easily with 
neoliberal imperialism and secondly to divert attention from 
the structural inequalities associated with such forms of domi-
nation. Celebrity activism involves new configurations of net-
worked relationship[s] that obfuscate the workings of neolib-
eral imperialism; thus reinforcing global power hierarchies in 
which hegemonic powers are depicted as humanitarian ‘sav-
iours’ whilst enforcing ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in the 
periphery. (Daley 377)4 
This process culminates in what I call the “affect of superiority”—a 
consolidation of proliferating minor affects that permit the Northern 
subject to feel better than, feel better about themselves, and appear noble 
and generous.
 So it is that the subjects on the receiving end of humanitarian aid 
(in Bulawayo’s novel, poor Zimbabwean children living in shantytowns 
on the edge of upper-class enclaves) are likewise reciprocally, neolib-
erally subjectivized and—given their dispossession at the edge of glo-
balized capital flows—subjugated. Bulawayo’s children are called into 
being as subjects in order to reify their structural subjugation to mate-
rial flows of capital and modes of exchange. Humanitarian assistance 
is increasingly displaced from structural aid provided by governmental 
agencies to the personal interventions of private charities. This is not to 
say that structural aid is inherently helpful: as Chenjerai Hove remarks, 
the strictures and adjustments required in exchange for a loan from the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) can be very damaging to strug-
gling economies. He observes that Harareans have renamed the IMF 
the “Infant Mortality Fund” (76).5 Displacing structural, governmental 
aid with privatized charitable aid, however, encourages the affective ex-
ploitation of Southern subjects, as Bulawayo argues. African subjects are 
expected to suffer telegenically and perform their immiseration for an 
audience both near and far in order to receive necessary aid and materiel. 
Bulawayo trots out an obvious straw man for these self-congratulatory 
attitudes and the affect of superiority that participation in these causes 
permits. Eliot is an old-style colonial intent on explicitly mining less 
privileged countries of rare and endangered resources, such as the “ivory 
slab the shape of the African map” that Darling steals from him know-
ing that it means nothing to him and that he will not notice its absence 
(Bulawayo, We Need 284). Eliot is an easy target: “He has traveled all 
over Africa but all he can ever tell you about the countries he has visited 
are the animals and parks he has seen” (269). Eliot knows that he has to 
perform interest in African people, but he does so without any irony or 
self-awareness. He asks Darling, for example, to teach him “[her] lan-
guage because he says he and his brother are going to [Zimbabwe] so he 
can shoot an elephant” (268). She comments: “I don’t know where my 
language comes in—like, does he want to ask the elephant if it wants to 
be killed or something?” (268). 
 The commodification of humanitarian causes indulges Eliot’s inflated 
sense of self and empowers him to treat subjugated postcolonial subjects 
as if they are required to need his assistance. He owns a chain of hotels 
and employs people from “Senegal, Cameroon, Tibet, the Philippines, 
Ethiopia, and so on” (263). Darling’s Aunt Fostalina, dripping scorn, 
remarks: “It was like the damn United Nations there” (263). Eliot sees 
himself as a savior, which Daley argues is increasingly the modus oper-
andi of the humanitarian-industrial complex. Neoliberal solutions that 
insist on the value of individuated subjects encourage donors to view 
solutions to humanitarian crises as interpersonal rather than structural. 
Accordingly, Eliot has “been nice to [Darling] like [she is] from Uganda, 
like [she is] one of the heartbreaking kids in the film” (Bulawayo, We 
Need 269). The neoliberal bait-and-switch—replacing the collective/
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structural with the individualist/interpersonal—permits Eliot to substi-
tute Darling for one of the children in the viral video, thereby excusing 
himself from participating in the commodified cause and working to 
understand the structural issues inherent in such humanitarian crises.
 Eliot’s wealth, in large part, permits him to be this sort of mindless, 
ineffectual, and offensive character, although Darling later discovers that 
his interest in Africa extends to a fetishization of African women’s bodies 
(namely, her Aunt Fostalina’s). Tellingly, Fostalina emerges from an as-
signation with Eliot “wrapped in her favorite wrap cloth, the one with 
the little fading flags of our country” (281). Eliot’s daughter Kate is 
also implicated in the neoliberalization of humanitarian aid; she returns 
from college with anorexia, attributed as the result of a bad breakup. 
Having experienced hunger, Darling has no sympathy for Kate’s self-
starvation. Kate unironically sports an “Invisible Children T-shirt” 
that “stick[s] to her body, bones screaming through the fabric” (267). 
She has participated in the literal substitution of consumption for aid, 
which Daley argues is an extension of neoliberalization. In Darling’s 
eyes, Kate’s self-imposed hunger is unethical. Darling thinks to herself: 
“You have a fridge bloated with food so no matter how much you starve 
yourself, you’ll never know real, true hunger” (Bulawayo, We Need 268). 
The irony of passively supporting a political cause that targets true suf-
fering through hunger is not lost on Bulawayo, although the text implies 
that it is lost on wealthy Northerners. 
 Kate is not the only passive-activist in the text, and not the only 
one who, as Darling notes, suffers from a fundamental un-self-con-
sciousness. Early in the text, before Darling has left Zimbabwe for 
“Destroyedmichigan,” she and her friends rove through the wealthy 
enclave of Budapest in search of guavas. The middle-class houses are 
protected from prying eyes and the jealousy of their adjacent shanty-
town neighbors by “tall fences and Durawalls” (4). The children stum-
ble into an encounter with a “tall, thin woman” eating a slice of pizza, 
who then “aims what is left of the thing at the bin by the door, misses, 
and laughs to herself like a madman” (6, 7). Darling, anticipating her 
later reflections on Kate’s anorexia, remarks: “We have never ever seen 
anyone throw food away, even if it’s a thing,” which, she skeptically 
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suggests from the limitations of her own postcolonial life, it is not—or 
should not be. This unnamed woman is wearing a t-shirt that says “Save 
Darfur” and is blithely unaware of the damning irony of wearing a shirt 
supporting a Sudanese humanitarian cause in a country with its own 
remarkable problems. Damning, too, is her invocation of a “Jesus diet,” 
a sly backhand by Bulawayo to prod at the ironic excesses of wealthy 
Northerners. The text suggests that someone who advertises her own 
privileged nobility on a t-shirt should aspire not to Jesus’ thinness but 
to his un-self-conscious charity. Problematically, the thin woman is not 
explicitly racialized, but she is implicated in colonialism by virtue of 
her declaration that she is “visiting [her] dad’s country” while she fin-
gers a golden map of Africa on a chain around her neck (7). Although 
Darling’s country is never named, it is quite clearly Zimbabwe, which 
renders the thin woman’s claim to “home” potentially potent. It recalls, 
as other white characters do in the novel, the tenuous claim to owner-
ship of the wealthy, white, ex-“Rhodesian” land-owning class.
 This thin woman also initiates the novel’s ongoing discourse about 
the commodification of suffering in the Global South. She is carrying 
a camera around her neck, which is a clear marker of economic privi-
lege. When she explains that it is a camera, Darling rebuts: “[W]e all 
know; even a stone can tell that a camera is a camera” (6–7). This seeth-
ing response indicates the consciousness that impoverished postcolonial 
subjects have of their own material inequality. The moment reveals the 
thin woman’s casual, uninterrogated privilege: she feels compelled to 
tell them what they already know, as if they could not already know it. 
Likewise, she asks the pregnant Chipo how old she is, but only responds 
with an unhelpful “Wow” after learning her age, a word that sums up 
her presumption of moral superiority to this pregnant child (7). 
 When the thin woman asks the children for a photograph, it comes 
as a surprise, if only because the children are accustomed to being pho-
tographed without their permission. Herein lies the meat of Bulawayo’s 
mirrored critique of the Northern presumption of privilege and its cul-
tivation of their affect of superiority. In their study of the differences be-
tween Associated Press and UNICEF images of children in and around 
the Sudanese civil war, Sadaf Rashad Ali, Debbie James, and Fred Vultee 
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state that images of children in conflict “serve institutional values and 
practices” that “personify foreign and domestic polic[ies] and organiza-
tional agenda[s] of adults” (3).6 The novel associates the request for pho-
tographs with palpable bodily suffering or disability—the thin woman, 
for instance, requests a photograph only after she has inarticulately moral-
ized about Chipo’s pregnancy. In directing the shot, she requests: “[Y]ou, 
look this way, no, I mean you, with the missing teeth, look at me” 
(Bulawayo, We Need 9). This art direction is a form of virtual violence 
that calls attention to the woman’s undeniable privilege and aesthetically 
arranges the vicarious horror that she assumes she is capturing, impli-
cating disfigurement as the condition of the Southern subject. Susan 
Sontag’s work on photography captures the oscillation between view-
ers’ assumption of their superiority and photographers’ need to indulge 
their own curiosity and the curiosity of their audiences. This is ramified 
in Regarding the Pain of Others, in which she extends her critique of pho-
tography and the trade in images of suffering. She poignantly remarks 
that “[b]eing a spectator of calamities taking place in another country 
is a quintessential modern experience, the cumulative offering by more 
than a century and a half ’s worth of those professional, specialized tour-
ists known as journalists” (18).7 
Yet Sontag is speaking about only a part of a greater movement—
the contemporary practice of “voluntourism” in which Northerners 
travel to impoverished countries to offer unsolicited humanitarian aid. 
Although the thin woman is not explicitly a voluntourist, she encapsu-
lates many of its most problematic premises. Unlike Eliot, who espouses 
no such rhetoric of being useful, travelers to the Global South increas-
ingly go with a desire to be helpful. Harng Luh Sin observes that “the 
perception that volunteer tourism can actually bring about sustainable 
changes or eradicate (or at least lessen) poverty in the world, is perhaps 
a utopian dream” (“Who” 991). This “utopian dream” is more apparent 
to Sin as an outside observer than it is to participating voluntourists, 
who can only “sense that they are developing (or at least performing a 
‘self ’ that has developed) a deeper understanding of local conditions” 
(Sin, “Volunteer” 492; emphasis added). Bulawayo’s novel preemptively 
subverts the expectations of readers in pursuit of “poverty porn”—and 
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shows the results of their misdirected and unrequested attempts to help. 
Sin’s research, which focuses on Cambodia, presents some of the locals’ 
responses to this new wave of “helpful” visitors: They are “rich kids who 
have nothing better to do. They don’t know anything about the develop-
ing world and they are just big guys who think they can develop things 
in one month’s time. I don’t like that. They are too spoilt. They are not 
meant for Cambodia. . . . They don’t learn anything because they think 
they want to change this world” (“Who” 988).
Sontag reminds us that “photographs of the victims of war are them-
selves a species of rhetoric. They reiterate. They simplify. They agitate” 
(On Photography 6). Images of suffering flatten the material reality of 
that suffering into a rhetorical statement; as a result, one can imagine 
that the thin woman’s photographs of Darling and her friends will be 
used to consolidate Northern pity for suffering Southern children, even 
as they efface the children’s individual subjectivity and agency in the 
service of rhetorically reiterating the construction of a class of Suffering 
Other. Sontag argues that “[p]hotographs objectify: they turn an event 
or a person into something that can be possessed” (On Photography 80). 
Ali, James, and Vultee extend this point when they argue that photog-
raphy is a “smoothing process that fits children into an ideological role 
that supports social order and stereotypes their bodies, movements, and 
facial expressions ensuring their recognizability to distant First World 
viewers” (3). Photographs are the modern objects that consolidate an 
uneven discourse that dehumanizes postcolonial subjects and insists on 
the moral superiority of the Northern subject. 
“Uglifying,” in Sontag’s estimation, “is a more modern function” of 
photography, inasmuch as it is “didactic, it invites an active response” 
(On Photography 81). And so the thin woman’s photos of the children, 
specifically in their pregnancy and dental decay, interpellate them as a 
commodified, tradable good: they are unwittingly performing suffering. 
To this end, Darling is reminded of a fable that the Mother of Bones, 
the local sage, told her: “Dudu the bird .  .  . learned and sang a new 
song whose words she did not really know the meaning of and . . . was 
then caught, killed, and cooked for dinner because in the song she was 
actually begging people to kill and cook her” (Bulawayo, We Need 9). 
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Darling guesses that the images the thin woman’s camera captures might 
be used in the same way. Although the children may smile, strike poses, 
and look pretty, as if in control of their appearance, they cannot be as-
sured that their pictures will not constitute a Northern tableau of suffer-
ing or be decontextualized; the thin woman is the one who controls the 
circulation of their images.
Bulawayo assumes photography to be an objectifying technê; nowhere 
in the novel is photography or videography used in a way that is not 
objectifying. When Darling and her American friends gather together 
to view images, they scroll through encyclopedias of pornography on 
XTube and Redtube (200). Her uncle Kojo gorges himself on “a war 
channel in case he is able to pick out his son from among the other 
American boys dressed like soldiers” (280). He “watches nothing but 
the war—soldiers bombing things, soldiers walking streets carrying big 
guns, soldiers crawling on the ground, soldiers making things explode, 
soldiers smashing building, soldiers in big ol’ cars crawling all over, chil-
dren trying to dodge the soldiers to play on the street like they are sup-
posed to” (261). There is no escaping our appetite to consume images 
of debasement and destruction. The fund of such images is tremendous, 
but so, too, is our conditioned desire. Although it is not the scope of 
this essay to dissuade people against the cultivation and dissemination 
of images of suffering, it does seek, through Bulawayo’s searching cri-
tique, to force readers to confront the mirror being held up to them as 
uncritical consumers of humanitarian causes and likewise to hold up a 
mirror to those captured photographic subjects traded in the informa-
tion-sphere as objects to excite pity and cultivate an unearned sense of 
superiority. Indeed, Kate’s and the thin woman’s participation in the 
neoliberal commodification of suffering is a resurgence of the colonial 
impulse; E. M. Forster’s A Passage to India suggests that “[i]t was, in a 
new form, the old, old trouble that eats the heart out of every civiliza-
tion: snobbery, the desire for possessions, creditable appendages” (261). 
Buying these affective commodities—both in the literal sense as com-
modities rebranded for their value-added quality of being in some im-
measurable way “ethical” and also in the figurative sense—is, to build 
on David Harvey’s work (and his famous formulation “accumulation 
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through dispossession”), an extension of the colonialist desire to culti-
vate superiority through affective dispossession. Trade in these images is 
increasingly a matter of accruing “creditable appendages” that “prove” 
our ethical consciousness.
When Darling attends the wedding of Dumi, one of Fostalina’s exes, 
she is confronted by the self-consciously left-liberal version of this af-
fective economy of suffering. While Kate, Eliot, and the thin woman 
are essentially flattened into caricatures of uninvested Northerners, at 
the wedding, Darling encounters the disappointing reality of interest. A 
woman in a blue dress fawns over Darling, asking her to “just say some-
thing in your language . . . anything, really” (174). When Darling does 
so (“sa-li-bo-na-ni”), the woman responds with oppressive enthusiasm, 
gushing, “Isn’t that beautiful?” (Bulawayo, We Need 174). The woman’s 
unironic celebration of all things vaguely African is an indictment of 
liberal Northerners who overcompensate for the dislocated suffering 
of others by cultivating superficial enthusiasm and collating disparate 
knowledges. She continues: “Africa is beautiful. . . . But isn’t it terrible 
what’s happening in the Congo? Just awful” (175). The woman par-
ticipates in the commodification of suffering and the exchange of affect 
that metabolizes Southern suffering as Northern self-reassurance. The 
primacy of nebulously considered African suffering trumps any particu-
larity: “Jesus, the rapes, and all those killings! . . . I mean, I can’t even—I 
can’t even process it. And all those poor women and children. I was 
watching CNN last night and there was this little girl who was just—just 
too cute, she says. Her eyes start to mist and she looks down” (175–76). 
The woman in the blue dress recalls the sort of inchoate moral superi-
ority that the voluntourists express and the local Cambodians decry in 
Sin’s research. Northerners assume that because of their economic power 
they are capable of swooping in, providing an easy fix, and then return-
ing to the comfort and security of their geopolitical privilege.
The woman references “[t]he rapes and the killings” as if there is 
no specificity to the sweeping crimes against humanity carried out in 
long-simmering internecine postcolonial conflicts. The sheer weight 
of the generic anonymity of the suffering is enough to bring her to 
tears, even as she fails to understand that the groom in the wedding 
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is Zimbabwean, as is Darling—not Congolese. The woman also flat-
tens Africa, as if the postcolonial political problems of individual coun-
tries are structurally identical across the continent. She lauds her niece, 
who is “going to Rwanda to help” (176). “She’s in the Peace Corps, 
you know, they are doing great things for Africa,” she intones, as if re-
hearsing a vicariously self-congratulatory mantra (176). When she con-
tinues, explaining that this same niece “went to Khayelitsha in South 
Africa to teach at an orphanage[,] . . . she puts her hand over her heart 
and closes her eyes briefly, like maybe she’s listening to the throb of 
her kindness” (176). Darling’s commentary exposes the self-celebrating 
projective activity of “doing great things for Africa” (176; emphasis 
added). The woman is not a participant in these charitable activities 
but accepts and doles out praise as if she, herself, has done such things, 
revealing the dangers inherent in the privatization of humanitarian aid. 
This interaction suggests that such privatization permits Northerners 
to assume responsibility for good works that they have not performed. 
The link becomes evident when the woman crows: “[O]h, she took 
such awesome pictures! You should have seen those faces!” (176). The 
visual economy of images of suffering and beaming children—the 
“cute” ones, anyway—is made clear, and the suspicion that Darling 
had fostered vis-à-vis the fable of Dudu the bird becomes starkly real: 
“Then I’m seeing myself in this woman’s face, back there when we were 
in Paradise when the NGO people were taking our pictures” (176–77). 
Darling realizes that pictures of her might be pawed over and mined 
for the affect of superiority by countless white Northern strangers and 
her experiences of hunger and poverty might permit others the benefit 
of self-congratulation. 
Privatized humanitarian aid, it bears insisting on, is not “free.” 
Humanitarian assistance in this system is not disinterested. In order to 
justify its own existence and efficacy, it must provide results and, inside 
the logic of capitalism, continuously seek its own expansion. In the pro-
cess of delivering the assistance that an aid organization is charged with 
giving, it requires reciprocal production from the recipients. Gone are 
the days in which such reciprocal labor would be performed manually 
for starvation wages while bolstering an exploitative industry export-
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ing raw materials—although those days exist simultaneously, geo- 
disparately with the contemporary affective economy. Instead, Southern 
subjects are expected to actually suffer, and to perform that suffering 
telegenically, in exchange for material assistance. In the novel, the arrival 
of a non-governmental organization (NGO) in Paradise is anxiously an-
ticipated because it provides necessary goods that the children’s parents 
are unable to provide on their scratched-together wages from the infor-
mal labor economy. The children’s anxiety and enthusiasm is an affective 
challenge to the NGO workers’ a priori self-congratulation: “What we 
really want to do is take off and run to meet the lorry but we know we 
cannot. Last time we did, the NGO people were not happy about it, like 
we had just committed a crime against humanity” (51). The children’s 
unbridled performance of anxiety and anticipation is an affront to the 
self-conscious dignity that the NGO workers require in return for their 
donated school supplies. There is a barely subterranean threat that if the 
children continue to clamor, the aid will dry up because of the aid work-
ers’ anxiety, fear, and self-protection.
Indeed, much like the woman in the blue dress, the NGO workers 
have created a profile of aid recipient that adheres to strict but unvoiced 
rules about appropriate behavior. This behavioral policing covers inter-
personal interactions with the NGO workers as well as the pictures that 
are inevitably harvested with each supply drop. The children have inter-
nalized the rules, and as the NGO lorry pulls up (late; as Darling notes, 
“they were supposed to come on the fifteenth of last month and now we 
are on another month”): 
[W]e are singing and screaming like we are proper mad. We 
bare our teeth and thrust our arms upwards. We tear the ground 
with our feet. We squint in the dust and watch the doors of the 
lorry, waiting for the NGO people to come out, but we don’t 
stop singing and dancing. We know that if we do it hard, they 
will be impressed, maybe they will give us more, give and give 
until we say, NGO, please, do not kill us with your gifts! (51). 
Darling renders explicit the idea that their performance—here, of a 
monstrous joy—is what is being traded for supplies. Darling also un-
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derscores the imbalance of the exchange: there is no reward, unfortu-
nately, for exceeding expectations with their performance. One of the 
mechanisms of control in this transfer is the role of Sis Betty, whose 
“job is to explain us to the white people, and them to us” (51–52). 
She occupies the role of “factor,” who in the colonial period acted as 
an aide to slave trading or as an intermediary for the colonial authori-
ties. Ayi Kwei Armah writes that under colonialism, “the educational 
process is turned into an elitist ritual for selecting slave traders . . . [but 
the] factor is a link that must be hidden. An irreplaceable link whose 
functioning depends on his being embedded in ‘his’ people, destroying 
them—a solvent—yet protected from reprisals because his functioning 
is secret” (222–23). There must be an intermediary in the enactment of 
the economy of affect, a middlewoman who facilitates the NGO’s be-
nevolence but who, in her eagerness to maintain the economic security 
of her position, actively works to ensure that the affect that is mined is 
performed to certain standards.
Sis Betty is a crucial link in the distribution of aid, but she functions 
like a colonial factor, carefully selecting, cultivating, and grooming the 
children to behave as the NGO workers already expect and desire they 
will behave: 
What are you doing, masascum evan? Liyahlanya, you think 
these expensive white people came all the way from overseas 
ipapa to see you act like baboons? Do you want to embarrass 
me, heh? Futsekani, don’t be buffoons zinja, behave at once or 
else we’ll get in the lorry and drive off right this minute with all 
this shit! she says. Then Sis Betty turns to the NGO people and 
smiles her gap-toothed smile. They smile back, please. Maybe 
they think she just told us good things about them. (Bulawayo, 
We Need 54–55) 
Sis Betty’s livelihood depends on her ability to wrangle the performances 
and photographs out of the children that are the currency with which 
the NGO workers are paid. Without acknowledging the financial boon 
of trading in these photos, Darling remarks on the affective currency 
generated in this encounter: 
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They just like taking pictures, these NGO people, like maybe 
we are their real friends and relatives and they will look at the 
pictures later and point us out by name to other friends and 
relatives once they get back to their homes. They don’t care 
that we are embarrassed by our dirt and torn clothing, that 
we would prefer they didn’t do it; they just take the pictures 
anyway, take and take. We don’t complain because we know 
that after the picture-taking comes the giving of gifts. (52) 
Darling’s invocation of “gifts” is an unwitting acknowledgement of the 
uneven exchange between the children and the NGO workers. She ob-
scures her own exploitation by imagining that the exchange is medi-
ated outside of traditional material commodity flows. There is a poetic 
melancholy in her repetition and reiteration of the word “take,” which 
is unencumbered by its object, “pictures,” and carefully swept over with 
the word “gift.” The children’s dirty and torn clothes are a crucial aspect 
of the exchange. If they were permitted to clean up or had the resources 
to do so, the interest driving the distribution of aid would ebb. Like the 
thin woman in Budapest, the NGO photographer is “so surprised” by 
Chipo’s pregnancy that he pauses. He all too briefly has the opportu-
nity to evaluate his presumptuous superiority, but he quickly “remem-
bers what he came here to do and starts taking . .  . away again” (52). 
The object, pictures, is once more effaced to reveal the true, immaterial 
nature of the exchange.
The distance between the Northern subject and the Southern object 
must be carefully maintained, and the children rehearse the unconscious 
rules that limit their exposure and frame their performance: “We are 
careful not to touch the NGO people, though, because we can see that 
even though they are giving us things, they do not want to touch us or 
for us to touch them” (54). Touch would collapse the difference between 
subject and object and force the NGO workers to confront their shared 
humanity. The camera lens is understood as a prophylactic against this 
realization. Likewise, as Godknows, one of the children, reminds his 
friends, “[y]ou are not supposed to laugh or smile. Or any of that silly 
stuff you are doing” (54). In doing so, he repeats Sis Betty’s injunction 
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against affective excess and insists on the supposed dignity of solemnity 
and gratitude.
The dynamics of the uneven exchange of humanitarian aid for 
the performance of suffering reaches its apex in the fever dream of 
Bornfree’s funeral. A young leader of the opposition party clamoring 
for change from Mugabe’s regime, Bornfree is brutally murdered for 
daring to pose a challenge to the existing administration.8 When BBC 
journalists arrive at the funeral to film this melancholy coda to a failed 
democratic revolution, they immediately retreat behind the distancing 
tools of their trade: “One is looking at everything through a thing, and 
the other is busy taking pictures” (136). The funeral proceeds, but at 
the end of the ceremony the children spontaneously begin to play-act 
the traumatic event of Bornfree’s murder, making up the improvisa-
tional rules as they go along, “proper drunk with verve” (140). Their 
imaginative performance of the murder is unsurprisingly captivating 
and serves a clear social purpose for the mourners, who “don’t make 
any sounds. There is this big black silence, like they are watching some-
thing holy. But we can see, in the eyes of the adults, the rage. It is quiet, 
but it is there” (143). The children do not enact this drama because 
there are cameras present but because they feel the collective compul-
sion of the people to work out and cathect their collective rage. It is 
clear, though, that the gruesome performance ends when it becomes 
too exhausting to revisit the original trauma: “[A]nd then finally, fi-
nally, we just stop. We are tired. Our voices are hoarse. Our faces are 
drained. Our weapons dangle at our sides, all bloodied. Our clothes are 
bloodied. The flag of our country is bloodied” (143). The performance 
pertains to and remains within the community, a witness to violence. It 
both appears and disappears suddenly and, crucially, the Northerners 
present miss the point: 
What kind of game is that? we hear somebody say behind us. 
We turn around to see the two BBC men have returned. They 
are watching us with their things, standing there among the 
graves. The camera clicks a few times, taking our pictures. Then 
the tall one with hair all over and a jungle on his face asks 
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again, What kind of game were you just playing? and Bastard 
puts his shirt on and says, Can’t you see this is for real? (143)
Bastard, one of the children, articulates their refusal to enact this com-
munal drama intelligibly for a consuming audience of outsiders. The 
stakes are suddenly too high. Whereas the children are resigned to trad-
ing their performative affect for material supplies, there is a sense that the 
BBC men are too late to have anything to contribute. Instead, they sit 
back while the promised change is fought over. It is only when the cyni-
cally feared failure occurs and resistance is quashed that the Northerners 
arrive to broadcast the now dead, once hoped for change. 
Bulawayo intervenes in the burgeoning economy of affect in the 
Southern world. Because private causes must compete for support and 
donations in an international affective marketplace, Southern subjects’ 
suffering is required to spur charity. This goodwill is undergirded by 
the affect of superiority that Forster describes. Donors desire a “credit-
able appendage” that bolsters their self-conception as “saviours” (Daley). 
The continual reiteration of this suffering, one fears, creates an exploita-
tive dependency in the suffering subjects to continue manufacturing 
the conditions of their own suffering at the behest of the North, which 
requires their economic and affective subjugation. Bulawayo describes 
Southern subjects as experiencing what I call suffering fatigue: it becomes 
exhausting to perform immiseration, and continual suffering is like-
wise exhausting.9 There must be some remainder kept back, something 
hoarded and guarded to ensure the survival of affect. If the sought after 
change is ever to occur, there must be some fund of hope and optimism 
to draw on after the Northerners have pulled up stakes, piled into their 
lorries, and driven off once more. More to the point, I think, is the 
notion that the demand for telegenic suffering does the awful work of 
alienating Southerners from their own affective experiences, even as the 
trade in these images obscures other, more harrowing experiences on 
the ground.10 Habila’s and Mabanckou’s characterizations of Bulawayo’s 
representation of this suffering as “poverty porn” miss the point alto-
gether, as Bulawayo’s oscillation between performative and materialist 
critique demonstrates. 
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Notes
 1 As far as can be determined, “poverty porn,” although not necessarily a new con-
cept, is a relatively new term. In what may be the first use of it, Collins defines 
“poverty porn” as “any type of media, be it written, photographed or filmed, which 
exploits the poor’s condition in order to generate the necessary sympathy for sell-
ing newspapers or increasing charitable donations or support for a given cause.” 
 2 It is hardly a secret that Facebook and other social media sites mine informa-
tion from the data inputted by users. An example is Facebook’s “like” feature: 
algorithms register the content and tenor of the post liked, and that informa-
tion accretes to a user’s consumer profile at the nexus of marketing algorithms. 
Gradually, one’s cumulative “social” behavior is capitalized on by virtue of its 
commodification. Users’ profiles enable all aspects of Internet marketing and 
commerce, both legitimate and illegitimate and can be harnessed to guide and 
direct marketing. Such a profile can likewise be used by hackers to determine 
the value of an identity and its attendant credit. See Hillis, Paasonen, and Petit, 
Networked Affect.
 3 For Hardt “the productive circuit of affect and value has thus seemed in many 
respects an autonomous circuit for the constitutions of subjectivity, alternative 
to the process of capitalist valorization,” by which he means an alternative to the 
varieties of commodity and currency exchange inherent in capitalism (M-C-M, 
etc.) (Hardt 89). However, Ahmed observes that the accumulation of the sur-
plus value of affect is indistinguishable from circulation because it is “produced 
as an effect of circulation . . . between objects and signs” (45). In the affective 
economy, the immaterial stimuli that determine our behavior as producers and 
consumers in the material economy are important as loci of pre-capitalization. 
Our health and wellness, our moods, and our social relationships and impinge-
ments create the conditions that lead us to desire consumption. Tomkins argues 
that “interest” is the “activator affect” for further affects—we must be interested 
in something if we are going to take joy in it. 
 4 Daley’s citation of “accumulation by dispossession” is a reference to the corner-
stone argument of Harvey’s The New Imperialism. 
 5 Klein’s The Shock Doctrine remarks on the awful legacy of Northern financial 
interventions in the Global South, tracing a wide range of human rights abuses, 
increasing income inequality, and the structural violence inherent in the hegem-
onic imposition of “structural adjustment programs.” The text is a potent rebut-
tal to conservative economists like Jeffrey Sachs, who push privatized aid as the 
solution to the South’s proliferating material woes.
 6 This augments what Lee Edelman calls the rhetoric of “reproductive futurity” 
that permeates neoliberal politics and serves as a rallying cry for social or political 
action.
 7 In On Photography, Sontag argues that early photography produced an arrogant-
ly constructed humanism, which rendered the camera an “instrument of that 
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essentially middle-class attitude, both zealous and merely tolerant, both curious 
and indifferent” (56).
 8 Peter Godwin describes this historical moment poignantly, explaining that, in 
2008, “I am on my way home to Zimbabwe, to dance on Robert Mugabe’s 
political grave,” only to discover that “Mugabe has not conceded defeat after all. 
There is no political grave on which to dance” (5, 14). Morgan Tsvangirai’s long-
simmering democratic challenge, which had seemed on the cusp of success, was 
stymied once more by Mugabe’s iron fist. Bulawayo narrates the moment from 
the perspective of the children who are swept up in the euphoric optimism of 
the political movement: “Now when men talk, their voices burn the aid, making 
smoke all over the place. We hear about change, about new country, about de-
mocracy, about elections and what-what” (59). All of this optimism is exhausted 
in the political violence, repression, and doctored electoral results, culminating 
in the horrifying tableau of Bornfree’s funeral.
 9 I am invoking the concept of “compassion fatigue,” the experience of exhaus-
tion that caregivers to the ill, disabled, or dying often feel. Likewise, “suffering 
fatigue” is meant to reverberate doubly—both as suffering (from) fatigue, and 
being fatigued by the perpetual performance of suffering. 
 10 The gulf between the aesthetic or public performance of suffering and the actual-
ity of suffering has been cynically abridged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu, who, during his country’s attacks on Gaza in 2014, claimed that 
the Palestinians were rhetoricizing their “telegenically dead” fellow-citizens to 
bolster support for their cause. Mbembe’s “necropolitics” seems an ever-more-
important piece of evidence in analyses of contemporary neoliberal hegemony.
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